Modelling the IAT:Implicit Association Test reflects shallow linguistic environment and not deep personal attitudes by Lynott, Dermot et al.
Modelling the IAT: Implicit Association Test Reflects Shallow Linguistic 
Environment and not Deep Personal Attitudes
Dermot Lynott (dermot.lynott@manchester.ac.uk), 
Himanshu Kansal (himanshu.kansal@postgrad.mbs.ac.uk)
Decision and Cognitive Sciences Research Centre, Manchester Business School, University of Manchester
Booth Street West, Manchester M15 6PB, UK
Louise Connell (louise.connell@manchester.ac.uk)
School of Psychological Sciences, University of Manchester, Oxford Road, Manchester M13 9PL, UK
Kerry O'Brien (kerry.o'brien@monash.edu)
Behavioural Studies, Monash University, PO Box 197, Caulfield East VIC 3145, AUSTRALIA
and School of Psychological Sciences, University of Manchester, Oxford Road, Manchester M13 9PL, UK. 
Abstract
People often have thoughts, attitudes and biases that are not 
themselves consciously aware of or that they would rather not 
share  with others.  To assess  such attitudes,  researchers  use 
paradigms like the Implicit Association Test (IAT) that do not 
rely on explicit responding to determine the level of bias a 
person holds towards a particular target concept (e.g.,  race, 
gender,  age).   Responses in the IAT are assumed to reflect 
deeply held beliefs and attitudes, and not shallow, superficial 
associations.   However,  as  linguistic  distributional 
information has been shown to serve as a viable heuristic in 
many cognitive  tasks,  we  investigated  whether  it  could  be 
used to predict the level of bias established by the IAT.  We 
used a large corpus of language (Web 1T) and data from 16 
IAT studies  (N = 1825) to  examine whether  the degree of 
linguistic  co-occurrence  for  target  concepts  and  attributes 
reflected the size of bias observed in human behavioural data. 
We  found  that  the  effect  size  of  the  linguistic  biases 
corresponded  strongly  with  the  effect  sizes  from  the 
behavioural data.  We suggest that language reflects prevalent 
cultural attitudes which are captured by tasks such as the IAT, 
suggesting  that  the  IAT  may  reflect  shallow,  linguistic 
associations rather than deeper conceptual processing. 
Keywords: linguistic  distributional  information;  implicit 
association test; IAT; attitudes; model.
Introduction
If we openly asked people questions like "are you sexist" or 
"are you racist",  we would probably  expect  people  to  be 
reluctant to respond, if we got any response at all.  When 
asking for judgements on controversial topics and divisive 
issues,  people  have  a  strong  desire  to  provide  socially 
acceptable  responses  that  may  be  contrary  to  their  true 
beliefs (e.g., Furnham, 1986; Paulus, 1991).  As such, there 
is  often  a  disconnect  between what  people  say  and  what 
they  do.  In  order  to  avoid  tasks  that  require  explicitly 
thinking  about  a  particular  issue  or  that  permit  strategic 
responding by participants, researchers in social cognition 
have  instead  developed  paradigms  that  try  to  tap  into 
people's attitudes in a more implicit manner (Fazio, Jackson, 
Dunton & Williams, 1995; Greenwald, McGee & Schwartz, 
1998).  The most frequently used of these paradigms is the 
Implicit Association Test, or IAT. The IAT is essentially a 
categorisation task, similar to many priming paradigms used 
across the cognitive sciences, designed to capture the degree 
of  bias  or  prejudice  that  an  individual  has  towards  a 
particular concept. (e.g, race, age).  We describe the task in 
more detail below.  
A search  using Google  Scholar  reveals  that  the  IAT is 
referenced in over 4000 papers in the last 10 years alone.  In 
spite of its widespread use, there is ongoing disagreement 
regarding what the IAT is actually measuring (Blanton et al., 
2009; Fazio & Olsen, 2003; Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlman 
&  Banaji,  2009).   Nonetheless,  the  creators  and  most 
proponents of the paradigm maintain that "the IAT assesses 
the  strengths  of  associations  between  concepts"  (p18., 
Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlman & Banaji,  2009) and it  is 
assumed  to  reflect  deep,  underlying,  unconscious  biases. 
However,  when  one  situates  the  IAT within  the  broader 
context of cognitive research examining the structure of the 
conceptual system, such a claim is ambiguous.  
Several researchers have described the conceptual system 
as  comprising two distinct  but interrelated  components;  a 
linguistic system and a simulation system (Barsalou, Santos, 
Simmons & Wilson, 2008; Connell & Lynott, 2011; 2012; 
Louwerse & Jeunieux, 2008).  The linguistic system reflects 
language usage, and captures the distributional patterns (or 
statistical  regularities)  of  words and  phrases,  making  this 
system best suited for "quick and dirty" heuristic processing 
(Lynott & Connell, 2010).  The simulation system, on the 
other  hand,  captures  perceptual,  affective  and  motor 
information from our environmental experience and is better 
suited to deep, slow, precise processing.  Thus, performance 
in  the  IAT may  reflect  responses  from one  of  these  two 
systems,  raising  two alternative  hypotheses.   The first,  is 
that  the  IAT  indeed  reflects  personal  attitudes  emerging 
from deep-rooted, affective and conceptual processing in the 
simulation  system.  For  example,  an  intelligence/obesity 
prejudice  (O'Brien  et  al,  2007)  would  take  the  form  of 
conceptual retrieval of a "fat person" automatically evoking 
associated concepts of "stupidity" and a negatively valenced 
affective  association  of  "badness".   This  perspective  is 
summarised by Nosek, Banaji and Greenwald (p112., 2002) 
who argue that implicit attitudes "reveal the deep influence 
of the immediate environment and the broader culture on 
internalized preferences and beliefs".  
The  second  option  is  that  IAT  scores  reflect  much 
shallower  processing  of  the  socio-cultural  environment, 
specifically  the  token-to-token  statistical  patterns  of  the 
linguistic system.  For example, people may often encounter 
the word "fat" in close proximity to the word "stupid" in 
conversations they hear or in texts they read, resulting in the 
automatic  activation  of  the  word  "stupid"  every  time  the 
word "fat" is encountered.  Importantly, activating a word 
like  "stupid"  does  not  require  full  conceptual  retrieval 
(Louwerse & Connell, 2011).  Rather, linguistic associations 
like  these  operate  at  a  shallow,  superficial  level  that  can 
produce  a  response  to  a  given  task  without  recourse  to 
deeper conceptual or affective processing.  
There is good reason to believe that the IAT may reflect 
the  latter  shallow  linguistic  associations  rather  than  the 
former  deeper,  affective,  conceptual  attitudes.   Several 
studies have shown that the linguistic system is used as a 
shortcut to provide a "good enough" response to conceptual 
tasks,  whenever  possible  (e.g.,  Connell  &  Lynott,  2012; 
Louwerse & Connell, 2011).  In particular, when processing 
demands  are  shallow and  the  participant  is  placed  under 
time  pressure  the  linguistic  system  provides  a  useful 
heuristic  for  responding  without  recourse  to  the  greater 
computational  expense  of  full,  perceptual,  affective  and 
motor simulation of the concept.  For example, conceptual 
tasks such as property-verification (e.g.,  making true/false 
judgments regarding object properties  - apple can be green) 
can  be successfully  completed solely  on  the  basis  of  the 
word-to-word  associations  of  "apple"  and  "green";  these 
words frequently appear in close proximity and therefore it 
is a reasonable heuristic to assume that this property belongs 
to  this  concept.   When  participants  respond  quickly 
(Louwerse & Connell,  2011)  or  when the set  of  items is 
poorly  constructed  (Solomon  &  Barsalou,  2004)  their 
responses are based on these linguistic associations and not 
on deeper conceptual representations.   For example, using 
response  time  data  from  a  property-verification  task, 
Louwerse and Connell (2011) demonstrated that measures 
of distributional patterns from the linguistic system could be 
used to predict the faster responses of participants, but not 
their  slower  responses.   Conversely,  measures  of  the 
simulation system could  predict slower responses, but not 
faster  responses.   Evidence that  the IAT does not  engage 
deeper processing is provided by  a recent study by Foroni 
and  Semin  (2012).   Foroni  and  Semin  had  two  groups 
complete the IAT; one group completed the task as normal, 
while  the  other  completed  the  task  with  facial  feedback 
being inhibited by holding a pen between the lips during the 
task.   Holding the pen in this position leads to sustained 
activation  of  the  zygomaticus  major  muscle  (used  in 
frowning),  which  is  normally  activated  following  the 
presentation of a valenced stimulus. However, inhibition of 
this muscle during the IAT made no difference to the level 
of bias observed.  This suggests that IAT does not engage 
the affective system in a way that would be expected if the 
task required processing in the simulation system. 
Given that the linguistic system is capable of providing 
quick and dirty responses in a variety of seemingly complex 
tasks  and  given  that  responses  in  the  IAT may  be  of  a 
superficial nature (i.e., not requiring the deeper processing 
of  the  simulation  system),  we  considered  whether  IAT 
biases  could  be  predicted  by  the  statistical  distributional 
associations in language.  While the linguistic associations 
and  simulation  systems  are  closely  related,  they  are  not 
exact replications of each other because each system gains 
experience from a different source.  Just because two words 
share  a  linguistic  association  in  the  socio-cultural 
environment,  because  they  are  sometimes  juxtaposed,  it 
does not mean that their referent concepts are tightly bound 
in  a  personal,  affective/conceptual  attitude.   If  IAT 
responses  are  predicted  by  linguistic  associations  then  it 
suggests  that  the  IAT itself  is  a  shallow  measure  of  the 
language structure to which an individual has been exposed 
and  not  necessarily  a  reflection  of  deeper  biases.   We 
describe  below  the  IAT  paradigm  in  more  detail  before 
outlining the current study. 
Condition Word belongs to...? “stupid” “smart”
Congruent
Bad OR Fat fast [incorrect]
Good OR Thin [incorrect] fast
Incongruent
Bad OR Thin slow [incorrect]
Good OR Fat [incorrect]  slow
Table  1:  Schematic  of  response  patterns  in  an  IAT  on 
obesity  prejudice.  The first  column describes  category  as 
congruent  or  incongruent  pairings.  The  second  column 
indicates the two judgements participants must consider for 
each target word.  Third and fourth columns describe the 
predicted  patterns  for  two  target  concepts  "stupid"  and 
"smart".   “Incorrect”  indicates  a  wrong  answer  (e.g., 
“stupid” should not be “good” or “thin”)
The Implicit Association Test 
The  IAT  represents  one  of  the  most  frequently  used 
paradigms for examining implicit attitudes (e.g., Greenwald, 
McGee  &  Schwartz,  1998),  with  hundreds  of  studies 
already published using this approach (see e.g., Greenwald, 
Poehlman,  Uhlman & Banaji,  2009).  The IAT is  used  to 
give an insight into people's automatically activated biases 
and prejudices  and is  designed to overcome the issues of 
strategising  and  socially  desirable  responding  by 
participants. The IAT achieves this by requiring extremely 
rapid and accurate responses from participants to tap into 
automatic associations between some target concept and an 
attribute.  For example,  O'Brien and  colleagues (O'Brien, 
Hunter  &  Banks,  2007)  examined  people's  anti-fat 
prejudices using the IAT to see whether people associated 
obesity  with  negative  concepts  like  stupidity.  The  IAT 
contrasts performance for a congruent pairing of targets and 
attributes  (e.g.,  obesity-bad;  thinness-good)  to  an 
incongruent pairing of targets and attributes (e.g., obesity-
good; thinness-bad). The participant's task is to categorise 
target stimuli as they appear on screen using one of these 
two pairings.   In a congruent block,  if  the word "stupid" 
appeared  onscreen,  the  participant  would  press  the  key 
indicating they belonged to the "fat OR bad" category, while 
if the word "smart" appeared they would press the key to 
categorise it as belonging to the "thin OR good" category. In 
this  way,  each  target  attribute  has  an  identifiably  correct 
response.  Table 1 presents a schematic of the responses in 
both  congruent  and  incongruent  conditions.  Every 
participant  completes  both  categorisation  pairings  in  a 
counterbalanced fashion. 
The  key  question  is,  which  pairing  do  participants 
respond most  quickly  to.   Once  all  responses  have  been 
made, a bias score can be calculated for each participant and 
then an overall bias can be calculated for the entire sample. 
If participants are generally faster in their responses for the 
congruent condition in the obesity IAT example above, this 
would  indicate  a  negative  bias  towards  obesity  related 
concepts.   In  analysing  response  times,  the  IAT scoring 
algorithm  calculates  the  difference  in  average  response 
latency between the congruent and incongruent conditions 
and dividing by the standard deviation of all latencies for 
both conditions (Nosek, Greenwald & Banaji, 2007).  For 
paper-based versions of the IAT the difference is calculated 
based on the number of correct  responses in a 20 second 
period  in  the  congruent/incongruent  conditions  (e.g., 
O'Brien et al, 2007).  If there is a large difference between 
the categorisation conditions in terms of response times or 
number of correct responses, this will result in a larger bias 
score.  The difference between congruent and incongruent 
response  times  or  accuracy  reflects  the  extent  to  which 
people believe that fat people are stupid and thin people are 
smart.   The  IAT is  thus assumed to offer  a  window into 
deeply-rooted  beliefs  and  prejudices  that  are  otherwise 
difficult to impossible to access explicitly.
The IAT has been used to uncover and measure biases in a 
wide  range  of  domains,  such  as  attitudes  towards  race 
(Greenwald,  McGee  &  Schwartz,  1998),  gender 
stereotyping (Rudman & Kalianski, 2000), alcohol (Wiers et 
al, 2011) and doping among athletes (Brand et al, 2011) to 
name but a few examples.  What's more, the IAT has been 
shown  to  be  predictive  of  people's  overt  behaviors, 
underscoring its practical utility.  In a meta-analysis of 156 
studies, Greenwald and colleagues (Greenwald, Poehlman, 
Uhlmann,  &  Banaji,  2009)  found  that  IAT  measures 
correlated significantly with explicit measures of behaviour. 
In some cases, IAT scores are better predictors of behaviour 
than  more  explicit  measures.  For  example,  Asendorpf, 
Banse, and Mucke (2002) found that shyness in individuals 
was  better  predicted  by  a  shyness-oriented  IAT  than  by 
explicit  self-ratings  of  shyness.   In  some  ways  the  IAT 
seems to capture attitudes and beliefs that we hold, but that 
which find it difficult to consciously and explicitly access 
ourselves. 
The Current Study
We have described the IAT paradigm and suggested how it 
may draw on processing from either the shallow linguistic 
system  or  be  reliant  on  deeper  processing  from  the 
simulation system.  To examine whether IAT performance is 
predicted  by  linguistic  associations  we  used  behavioural 
data from several published IAT studies and linguistic data 
extracted from the World Wide Web, using the Web 1T 5-
gram  corpus  (Brants  &  Franz,  2006).  The  Web  1T is  a 
snapshot  of  web  pages  indexed  by  Google  in  2006  and 
contains over 1 trillion tokens, making it one of the most 
representative corpora of language available.  Our aim was 
to examine whether co-occurrence patterns in the linguistic 
data  could  predict  the  effect  sizes  observed  in  the 
behavioural data.  We expected that if implicit attitudes (as 
captured by the IAT) reflect  the  distributional  patterns  of 
language  in  the  linguistic  system,  then  we  should  see  a 
significant fit between the two sets of data using regression 
analyses.   On the other hand, if  the IAT relies  on deeper 
processing in the simulation system, we would not expect 
such a relationship to exist. 
IAT Topic Reference N
Race (2) Rudman & Ashmore, 2007 128
Flowers vs Insects Greenwald et al., 1998 32
Instrument vs Weapon Greenwald et al., 1998 32
Japanese vs Korean (2) Greenwald et al., 1998 64
Alcohol Wiers et al., 2011 108
Doping (2) Brand et al., 2011 102
Alcohol and Sport O'Brien & Lynott, in prep 120
Obesity (3) O'Brien et al, 2007 1032
Gender (3) Rudman  &  Kalianski, 
2000
207
Table 2: Sources of the 16 Implicit Association Tests used in 
the  study,  with  number  of  studies  from  each  source  in 
brackets, and the total N participants for each source. 
Method
Materials We selected 16 IATs from journal  articles  that 
used lexical (as opposed to pictorial) stimuli and provided a 
full  list  of  materials  used.   Table  2  lists  the  topics  of 
investigation for each of the IATs, the source reference and 
the total sample sizes from the original studies; 15 of the 
studies come from published journal articles and one from a 
paper in preparation (O'Brien & Lynott, in prep). The IATs 
cover  a  broad  range  of  topic  areas,  including  studies  of 
racial  stereotypes,  obesity  and  gender  roles.  Each  IAT 
consists of a set of category concepts (e.g.,  male, female, 
good, bad) and a set of target attributes that are of positive 
or negative valence (e.g., reliable, pleasant, terrible, nasty). 
The number of attributes used by the IATs ranged from 3 to 
25, with a total of 324 target stimuli. 
Human Behavioural  Data   The 16 IATs represent data 
from 1825 participants.   From each IAT we extracted the 
overall  effect  size  of  the bias  found based on the human 
responses  (DH).  The  IAT effect  size  is  closely  related  to 
Cohen's d, a popular measure of statistical effect size.  
Linguistic Model The aim of the model is to calculate the 
size of the linguistic bias (DL) for each IAT, based on the 
specific terms used in each task.  In order to approximate 
the  linguistic  distributional  information,  we  carried  out  a 
corpus analysis using the Web 1T 5-gram corpus.  Using the 
corpus we are able to calculate the difference in the strength 
of  associations  for  each  categorisation  condition  in  each 
IAT.   For  example,  for  an  IAT examining  preference  for 
flowers versus insects, we calculate the level of association 
between one categorisation pairing (e.g., co-occurrences for 
"flower"  and  all  positive  attributes  +  co-occurrences  for 
"insect"  and  all  negative  attributes)  and  the  inverse, 
"incongruent"  categorisation  pairing  (co-occurrences  for 
"flower"  and  all  negative  attributes  +  co-occurrences  for 
"insect" and all positive attributes).
The strength of association is calculated by summing the 
frequency of co-occurrences of category terms (e.g., flower, 
insect) with each of the attribute terms (e.g., nice, horrible, 
etc.,).   For  each  category-attribute  pairing  (e.g.,  flower-
nice),  we  calculated  the  cumulative  5-gram frequency  of 
forward and backward co-occurrences between the category 
word and attribute (i.e., the summed count of occurrences of 
[flower … nice] and [nice ... flower] in the corpus with zero, 
one,  two  and  three  intervening  words:  for  a  similar 
approach, see Louwerse & Connell, 2011).  Because of the 
large  number  of  calculations  this  required  (>10,000),  we 
developed a semi-automated tool to  take  each set  of  IAT 
terms and output the collocation frequencies from the Web 
1T  corpus.  Using  these  summed  frequencies  we  then 
calculated  a  linguistic  effect  size  using  two  models;  one 
model based on raw frequency counts and one model based 
on the log-transformed frequencies (using the natural log). 
Ji  (2010)  discusses  the  improvement  in  the  distribution 
curves  of  datasets  of  seven  sub-corpora  after  having 
undergone  log  transformation  as  the  transformation 
mitigates the effects of extreme values (i.e., highly frequent 
terms).  Thus, both linguistic models represent the ratio of 
the frequencies  for  the  congruent categorisation condition 
compared  to  the  frequencies  of  the  incongruent 
categorisation  condition.  Finally,  we  conducted  separate 
linear  regression  analyses  for  the  two  linguistic  models 
using the linguistic bias (DL) as a predictor variable and the 
behavioural bias (DH) as the dependent variable. 
Results & Discussion
The effect sizes in the human data ranged from -.49 to 3.65 
(M = 1.2, SD = 1.07), while the effect sizes in the linguistic 
data ranged from .2 to 7.3 (M = 2.02, SD = 2.1) for the raw 
frequency model and from .85 to 1.31 (M = 1.05, SD = .14) 
Figure 1: Scatterplot, with line of best fit, for IAT scores from human behavioural data 
plotted against scores derived from log-transformed linguistic data. 
for  the  log-transformed  model.   Using  linear  regression 
analyses  we  found  significant  relationships  between  the 
effect  sizes  calculated  from the  human data,  DH,  and  the 
effect sizes calculated from the linguistic models, DL.  This 
positive relationship indicates that the larger the effect in the 
linguistic data, the larger the predicted effect in the human 
data.  Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between the biases 
predicted  from  the  log  ratio  linguistic  model  and  those 
derived from the human data.  The regression model for the 
raw frequency ratio model was significant (r2  = .612, p < .
001,  n  =  16)  resulting  in  a  β-coefficient  of  .782  for  the 
linguistic predictor (t = 4.696,  p < .001).  The regression 
model for the log frequency ratio model was also significant 
(r2  = .596, p < .001, n = 16) resulting in a β-coefficient of .
772 for the linguistic predictor (t = 4.544, p < .001).   This 
indicates that both models reflect approximately 60% of the 
variance in the human IAT scores.  
General Discussion
This  study  investigated  whether  linguistic  distributional 
information  can  be  used  to  predict  levels  of  implicit 
attitudes as measured by the Implicit Association Test.  We 
observed significant relationships between effect sizes from 
human  behavioural  data  and  effect  sizes  calculated  from 
linguistic  distributional  data.  This  finding  suggests  that 
performance on the IAT may not reflect the deeply-rooted 
biases  and  beliefs  held  by  individuals  and  groups,  but 
instead reflects shallower linguistic associations they have 
encountered in their environment.  While the present results 
are promising, there are of course some caveats we need to 
be  aware  of.   We  discuss  some  of  these  limitations  and 
avenues for future research below.  
An obvious question to ask is,  if  the  IAT reflects  only 
shallow linguistic processing, then how is IAT performance 
predicting overt behaviours?  There are two issues here. The 
first  is  that  the  while  IAT  is  successful  in  predicting 
outcomes  in  certain  sub-domains  (e.g.,  political 
preferences),  it  poorly  reflects  outcomes  in  others  (e.g., 
sexual orientation; Greenwald et al., 2009).  The second is 
that even where IAT performance is claimed to predict other 
behavioural outcomes, the claims may not stand up to closer 
scrutiny.  It is important when comparing overt measures to 
IAT performance that one uses implicit tasks that have clear 
behavioural outcomes.  Good examples of this are patient 
treatments and using realistic CVs/resumés for assessing job 
candidates.  Green et al (2007) found that doctors' levels of 
implicit  bias  towards  black  patients  did  not  always  tally 
with their decision to offer treatment using thrombolysis to 
remove blood clots. Although doctors with higher anti-black 
bias  were  less  likely  to  treat  black  patients  than  white 
patients  using  thrombolysis,  those  doctors  with  low anti-
black bias  (but  not  a  pro-black bias)  were  actually  more 
likely  to  treat  black  patients  than  white  patients.   In  re-
analysing data looking at racially discriminating behaviour 
in job candidate selection, Blanton and colleagues  (2009) 
found  that  the  IAT  failed  to  predict  any  discriminatory 
behaviour when factors such as rater reliability and outlier 
removal  were  taken  into  account.   In  one  case,  previous 
evidence  of  anti-black  prejudice  was  actually  reversed 
revealing a pattern of pro-black bias.  However, the process 
of candidate evaluations can be broken down further.  For 
example,  selection  and  shortlisting  of  candidates  can  be 
viewed  as  more  of  a  heuristic  process,  while  providing 
specific grades to individual candidates can be seen as more 
deliberative.    Blommaert,  van  Tubergen  and  Coenders 
(2011)  distinguished  between  these  two  aspects  of  the 
candidate assessment process while examining the effects of 
implicit attitudes towards ethnicity and gender.  They found 
that  only  explicit  measures  predicted  people's  grading  of 
candidates,  but  that  both  implicit  (IAT)  and  explicit 
measures  predicted  people's  shortlisting  of  candidates. 
Thus,  it  is  important  to  take  into  account  both  the  task 
domain  and  the  nature  of  the  task  (i.e.,  heuristic  or 
deliberative) to have a clearer idea of whether the IAT and 
therefore  linguistic  distributional  information  may have  a 
role to play in predicting behavioural outcomes. 
A limitation of  the current approach  is  that  it  does not 
discriminate  between  different  groups  and  different  task 
contexts and how this would affect performance on a given 
IAT.  For example, we would not necessarily expect a group 
of  American students and a group of Chinese students to 
show the same type of bias judging American and Chinese 
faces  paired  with  positive  or  negative  attributes.  One 
possibility  would  be  to  extend  the  model  to  incorporate 
additional domain terms that would calculate co-occurrence 
frequencies  but  limited  to  specific  contexts  to  attempt  to 
approximate these contextual effects. 
Although  it  may  be  argued  that  language  reflects  our 
cultural beliefs and social norms, it is difficult to establish a 
causal  relationship  between  implicit  attitudes  and  the 
linguistic data.  It may be that the  linguistic distributional 
information is a) driving the formation of these biases, b) is 
the behavioural outcome of these biases or c) part of a self-
sustaining cycle of biases influencing language influencing 
biases  and  so  on.   However,  it  is  clear  that  exposure  to 
socio-cultural attitudes does impact our own attitudes and 
behaviours,  as  developmental  changes are evident  in  IAT 
performance.   For  example,  older  subjects  tend  to  show 
larger IAT effects than younger subjects (Hummert, Garstka, 
O’Brien, Greenwald, & Mellott, 2002).  As language is one 
of  the key  methods for  the transmission of  socio-cultural 
information, this underscores the possible role for language 
exposure  in  the  formation  of  implicit  attitudes  (Nosek, 
Greenwald & Banaji, 2007).  
In  conclusion,  we  present  the  first  model  of  implicit 
attitudes based on linguistic data extracted from the world 
wide web. We found that linguistic models revealed a strong 
correspondence  with  human  behavioural  data.   We  see 
language as a primary means for transmission of attitudinal 
information  and  agree  with  Uhlman  and  colleagues  (in 
press) that "implicit attitudes reveal the power of cultures to 
reproduce  themselves in  individual  minds".  However,  our 
findings also suggests that such implicit attitudes may not 
represent  deeply  rooted  beliefs  as  has  previously  been 
assumed.  Ongoing work is exploring the predictive power 
of  the  model  by  using  linguistic  data  to  predict  attitude 
effect sizes in advance of behavioural studies, providing a 
strong test whether our hidden beliefs can be revealed in the 
patterns of our language use.   
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